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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v* 
CHRISTINA L. GRAY 
and MARK J. GRAY, 
De fendants/Appellants. 
Joint Appeal No. 20050136-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l (l)(a) (2003) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this Court's 
junsdictioa over this appeal from two separate Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
(collectively, the "Judgment"), entered on January 10, 2005, regarding Christina L. Gray 
("Christina"), and Februaiy 4,2005, regarding Mark J. Gray (individually, "Mark" and with 
Christina, the "Grays") respectively, in this case involving second degree felony convictions 
from a cojrt of record. A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
CO^STITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Was Christina Gray's trial counsel, Russell D. Hartill, ineffective when 
he failed to request a necessary lesser-included offense jury i nstruction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims raised for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, f20, 
984 P.2d 376. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial 
counsel' 'rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment' and that 'counsel's perfonnance prejudiced' " the defendant. Id; see 
also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct 2052 (1984). 
ISSUE II: Was Mark Gray's trial counsel, Jann L. Farris, ineffective when he failed 
to request a necessary lesserAncluded offense jury instruci ion? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims raised for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, ^ [20, 
984 P.2c 376. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial 
counsel ' 'rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment' and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced' " the defendant. Id; see 
also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
ISSUE HI: Was Christina Gray's counsel, RussellD. Hartill, ineffective in failing to 
call a necessary expert witness for her defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims raised for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, |20, 
984 P.21376. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial 
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counsel" 'rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment' and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced'" the defendant Id; see 
also Stricldand v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
ISSUE IV: Was Mark Gray's counsel, Jann L. Farris, ineffective infaili ng to call a 
necessary expert witness for his defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims rais ed for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 19991JT 32, f 20, 
984 P.2d 3 76. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must shew that trial 
counsel"' -endered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment' and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced' " the defendant. Id; see 
also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
ISSUE V: Did the "reasonable doubt "jury instruction presented at trial incorrectly 
state the law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is 
review able under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference giver to the trial 
court's ruling. State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8,114,84 P.3d 841, citing State v. Archuleta.850 
P.2d 1232,1244 (Utah 1993). Determining the propriety of the instructions submitted to the 
jury presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. Id. at ^ f 15, see, Ames 
v.Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah App. 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. CpNSTmJTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND. IV 
B. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND. VI 
C. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMEND. XTV 
D. UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. I § 7 
E. UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. I § 12 
F. UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. I § 14 
G. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-401 
H. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109 
H. U T . R . E V I D . 6 1 5 
STATEMENT OF THE C. ASF. 
Chi March 22, 2004, Mark and Christina Gray were charged in the above-captioned 
matter by Information with Child Abuse, a Second Degree Felony, pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §15-5-109(2)(a). On September 15, 16 and 17,2004, the matter came for a jury trial 
before Honorable Robin W. Reese of the Third Judicial District Court. Both Appellants, Mark 
and Chri stina Gray, were found guilty of the charge. On January 10,2005, Mark ;jnd Christina 
were individually sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
$18,500.00, which sentence and fine was suspended. They each received three (3) years of 
probation and 180 days of jail time in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
On January 10,2005, and February 4,2005, the trial court entered its Minures, Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment regarding Christina Gray and Mark Gray, respectively (collectively, 
the "Judgment"). On February 7, 2005, the Grays filed their joint Notice of Appeal with 
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respect to the judgment. On February 28, 2005, Mark and Christina filed their Docketing 
Statement, challenging the effectiveness of their individual trial counsel at the juiy trial. 
Or March 17,2005, the Grays filed ihe\r Joint Motionfor Certificate of Probable Cam 
and Memorandum in Support in this matter, which came for hearing before the Honorable 
Robin Reese of the Third Judicial District Court on April 18, 2005, and was denied by this 
Court on that same date. On March 18,2005, the Grays filed their Joint Motion for Certificate 
ofProbab le Cause and Memorandum in Support with this Court. On April 29,2005, Mark and 
Christina filed their detailed Joint Rule 23B Motion for Remand alleging that Mark and 
Christina's prior attorneys failed to adequately investigate the case, failed to present necessary 
evidence, and failed to prepare Mark and Christina to testify, resulting in a violation of their 
constitutional right to testify. 
On May 19,2005, the Grays filed their Joint Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause 
and Memorandum in Support with this Court. In an order signed June 16, 2005. this Court 
denied the Grays' Joint Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause and Memorandum in Support 
and Joint Rule 23B Motion for Remand. On August 18,1005, the Grays filed their Motion for 
Reconsideration of Joint Rule 23B Motion for Remand, which was denied by this Court on 
August 29,2005. The matter was then reset for briefing. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
M ark was previously married to Bonnie Gray, with whom he had three chi Idren, to wit: 
a female child, K.G. bom August 29,1990; the male child to whom this case pertains, J.G., 
bom November 19, 1991; and a male child, A.G., bom November 1, 1993 (collectively, the 
"Gray Children"). Christina was previously married to Michael Glade Sweat, with whom she 
had three children, to wit: a male child, M.S., bom September 15,1987; a female child, T.S., 
bom January 22, 1990; and a male child, D.S., bom July 12, 1994 (collectively, the "Sweat 
Children")- Mark and Bonnie were divorced and Christina and Michael were divorced.. Mark 
and Christina were subsequently married, both retaining custody of their children and 
combining the six children into one household. 
Over the next several years as it pertains to the minor child, J.G., the Grays accessed 
assistance through the Magna Elementary School counselors, resource teachers, and the 
principal. It was determined by these individuals that they could not meet J.G.'s needs in their 
regular or resource curriculum, so J.G. began attending day treatment at Valley Mental Health 
in place of school, specifically the ACES and KIDS programs. (Tr. at pp. 348,3 52). None of 
the treatments or programs or medication seemed to be helping J.G., however. The Magna 
Elemenl ary School principal, Ernest D. Broderick contacted DCFS to seek assistance on behalf 
of the Grays, but was informed that there was nothing they could do absent wrongdoing on the 
part of the Grays. (Tr. at pp. 382,383). 
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Sometime during the end of the year 2002 and beginning of 2003, when J.(}. was only 
eleven ye;*rs old, he began running away from home and school. (Tr. at pp. 28, 267, 339). 
Sometime 5 J.G. would be gone for only hours, other times he would be gone for days at a time. 
(Tr. at p. 28,346). While on the run, J.G. had been known to knock on people's doors asking 
for food aid money, he broke into someone's trailer, he slept in a tree, he made bis way to a 
major higliway and tried to hitchhike to Florida, and did several other things placng himself 
in dangerous situations. (Tr. at pp. 265,266,267). Mark and Christina attempted to elicit help 
from several agencies, including Primary Children's Medical Center, Valley Mental Health, 
Youth Services, and various resource teachers, school counselors and psychologists, and the 
school principal. (Tr. at p. 194,195,347). 
On August 20, 2003, Principal Broderick called Mark Gray in to mee: with him 
respecting J.G.. (Tr. at p. 361). While they were meeting, J.G. was supposed to be sitting 
outside ths principal's office, but instead ran away while his father and the prircipal were 
meeting. (Tr. at pp. 362,363). Following this instance, J.G. continued running away from both 
home and school. (Tr. at 346) 
The; Grays and the school were so concerned that they implemented a han ioff policy 
where J.G would be under extreme supervision when transferring from home to school and 
from class to class. (Tr. at 363.) Mr. Broderick was extremely concerned over J.G. running 
away front the school, so he contacted Deputy Timpson of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Department and asked him to accompany him to the Grays' house. (Tr. at p.363). Broderick 
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and Timpson planned to speak with J.G. about truancy and scare him into not running away 
from the school again. (Tr. at p. 364). 
Upon arriving at the Grays, Broderick and Timpson spoke with Christina, w ho indicated 
her frustration and concern regarding J.G. running away. (Tr. at pp. 364, 365 >. Timpson 
informec her that she needed to restrain J.G. Christina told the officer she had thought of 
handcufiling J.G. so he would not run away. Timpson responded that she should do whatever 
it takes, ;is long as she did not harm J.G. (Tr. p. 366). 
In the afternoon of October 1, 2003, Deputy Michael Lee of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Department responded to a call alleging child cruelty at the home of Appellants, Mark 
and Chri stina Gray (collectively, the "Grays'5), located at 2859 South 8500 West, Magna, Utah. 
(Tr.at pp. 73-74). The Grays were not at home at the time. (Tr. at p. 75). 
Either the minor child A.G. or the minor child D.S., who were both nine ye ars old at the 
time, answered the door and Deputy Lee entered the home. (Tr, at p. 75.) Deputy Lee spoke 
with the minor in charge, Colleena Norman, who was approximately seventeen years old at the 
time, and asked to speak with the minor at issue, J.G. (Tr.at p. 419). Colleena and the children 
went downstairs and came back up with J.G. (Tr. at p. 419). Deputy Lee noticed Colleena 
carrying a set of handcuffs in her hand when the children returned with J.G. and he told her to 
give them to him, which she did. (Tr. at p. 419). Deputy Lee then went down into the 
basement and observed a braided rug on the floor of the hallway, a pillow, books, and a cinder 
block with two chains connected to it. (Tr. at pp. 82, 83). These were in the general area of 
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the washer and dryer and a toilet (Tr. at p. 83). Deputy Lee asked one of the children what 
these observed items were for and they told him that is where they had to chain up J G. because 
he ran away. (Tr. at p. 86). Deputy Lee then asked the children to contact their parents and 
have them come home. (Tr. at p. 86). 
DCFS was contacted and J.G. was removed from Mark and Christina's custody and 
placed in the Christmas Box House ("CBH"). (Tr.atpp. 103,284). On October 14,2003, J.G. 
was told to stay in his room at the CBH. (Tr. at p. 285) J.G. became angry and destroyed a bed 
worth $500.00 over being denied a candy bar that he wanted. (Tr.atpp. 248,249,285). J.G. 
was considered for detention, but was found to be too young. Since he was approaching his 
twelfth biithday, it was determined that he should be placed at ARTEC. 
Dr. Tall, who conducted a Psychological Evaluation on J.G. testified that J.G. was 
aggressive and defiant when he first came to ARTEC, but that the longer he stayed there, with 
the help of therapy and medication, the better able he was to regulate his emotions and 
behavior. (Tr.atpp. 278-279). However, after three (3) months at ARTEC, DCFS determined 
that J.G. was not succeeding in the placement and, on January 30, 2004, custody and 
guardianship of J.G. was given to J.G.'s paternal aunt and uncle, Vicki and Rex White (the 
"Whites"). 
Mark and Christina were contacted by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department and 
asked if they would voluntarily submit to interviews, which they both did. Both admitted to 
chaining J G. as a last resort to protect him from harming himself by constantly runuing away. 
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(Tr. at p. 87) They would chain J.G. only when neither of them could be around Jiim, because 
he would run away if left in the care of Colleena or another individual. They wrapped material 
underneath the handcuffs to make sure they did not hurt him. J.G. himself said he could get out 
of the handcuffs whenever he wanted to do so. (Tr. at pp 426,490,498). 
C»n March 22, 2004, Mark and Christina Gray were charged in the above-captioned 
matter by Information with Child Abuse, a Second Degree Felony, pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §75-5-109(2)(a)._ (Tr. at p. 11). On September 15,16 and 17,2004, the matter came for 
a jury tr al before Honorable Robin W. Reese of the Third Judicial District Court. (Tr. at pp. 
1,190,446). Mark was represented by Jann L. Farris and Christina was separately represented 
by Russell Hartill. (Tr. at pp. 17,23). 
As early as June 18, 2004, the State sent formal notice to Hartill and Farris that it 
intended to call Dr. David Lewis Corwin as an expert at the trial in this matter. Dr. Corwin is 
trained is a psychiatrist, child psychiatrist and forensic psychiatrist, and is working as a 
professor of pediatrics at the University of Utah, chief of the Division of Child Protection and 
Family Health and medical director of Primary Children's Center for Safe and Healthy 
Families. (Tr. at p. 191). It was anticipated that Dr. Corwin would be testifying respecting the 
element of "serious physical injury" by stating that chaining a child in the house for an 
extende i period of time is not a reasonable method to protect a child and that it is clearly in the 
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realm of psychological maltreatment/abuse1. Armed with this notification, neithei Hartill nor 
Farris made any preparations to call an expert on either Christina and Mark's behalf at the trial 
in this matter 
On September 15,16 and 17,2004, the matter came for a jury trial before Honorable 
Robin W. Reese of the Third Judicial District Court- During the State's presentation of their 
case, the> called DCFS caseworker Janise Tingey (hereinafter "Tingey"), aad elicited 
testimony from her that she was at the Grays house at 6:30 p.m. on the day of the incident at 
question. Tingey provided damaging testimony that Christina had asked if she cou Id have the 
handcuffs because she wanted to take them back to get her money back. (Tr. at p. 112.) Upon 
cross-examination, Farris determined that he had not received any of Tingey's activity records 
or reports. (Tr. at p. 113). The trial court requested that Tingey provide them to defense 
counsel, which she did. Id. 
The court dismissed Tingey subj ect to recall by defense counsel after they ha d reviewed 
her activity records. On her way out of the courtroom, the trial judge admonished Tingey not 
to discuss her testimony with anyone. (Tr- at p. 113). However, upon leaving the courtroom, 
Tingey began discussing her testimony with deputies from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Department in the hallway of the courthouse. (Tr. at p. 302) This was overheard by defense 
witness Jason Kass, who testified with specificity concerning the matter. Neither Hartill nor 
1
 5^, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109(l)(d). 
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Farris m ide a motion to the trial judge, however, and the incident went unchallenged. Tingey 
was nevsr recalled to testify by defense counsel. 
With the fact established that the chaining did occur, Farris and Hartill pursued the 
defense that neither Mark nor Christina had the requisite intent to cause "serious physical 
injury" to J.G., as that term is defined under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109(l)(d). (Tr.atp.18). 
Farris and Hartill argued that Mark and Christina were simply trying to protect J.G. from 
running away. (Tr. at p. 19). Neither Farris nor Hartill presented any specific e\ idence to the 
jury witi respect to the prior abuse of J.G. by Bonnie. Farris, however, argued in his closing 
that J.G admitted that Bonnie had done bad things to him, but Farris said he did not want to 
"..•get ir to specifics..." because "...I think we've heard about those and I, myself don't want to 
hear abc ut them any more." (Tr. at p. 488). Hartill similarly argued in his closiig that "...we 
heard [J G.'s] biological mother beat him, locked him up, denied him food and hit him in the 
head." (Tr. at p. 495). Although Farris and Hartill had information pertaining to J.G.'s prior 
abuse, this evidence was never presented to the jury. 
^Vhen the parties and judge were discussing the jury instructions, Farris and Hartill did 
not reqi: est a lesser included jury instruction in line with their defense. (Tr. at pp. 458-465; 
Christina Gray Record ("CGR") at 085-108; Mark Gray Record ("MGR") at 076-099). 
Although several defense and prosecution witnesses presented testimony on the element of 
criminal negligence, Farris and Hartill failed to request a lesser-included offense jury 
instruction on a class A misdemeanor child abuse charge which requires a finding of "criminal 
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negligence" rather than the element of "intentionally and knowingly" causing the harm found 
in the second degree felony child abuse charge. The jury was only given the option of either 
second degree felony child abuse or acquittal. 
Also with respect to the jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury with respect 
to the reasonable doubt standard in criminal law. More specifically, Jury Instruction No. 8 
states, in pertinent part, that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that 
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
uponit,an&obviates all reasonable doubt." (Tr. at pP. 470-471 ;CGR093;MGR08^ (emphasis 
added)). Neither Hartill nor Farris objected or discussed the language in Jury Instraction No. 
7. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty for 
both Mark and Christina on the Second Degree Felony Child Abuse charges. (Tr. at pp. 511, 
512). Following the jury trial, Mark and Christina retained new counsel herein for further 
representation based upon their belief that their respective trial counsels had been ineffective. 
The Gray's new counsel, who is counsel herein, retained clinical psychologist, Dr Lawrence 
D. Beall, Ph.D., the director of the Trauma Awareness & Treatment Center, to undertake a 
study of the Grays. 
Dr. Beall conducted Psychological Assessments on both Mark and Christina Gray and 
a Parenting Assessment, and undertook clinical observations and research regarding the issues 
germane to this case. Dr. BealPs assessments and reports were provided to the trial court prior 
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to sentencing and are part of the record on appeal. In the process of conducting fie Parenting 
Assessm* ait, Dr. Beall relied upon information gleaned from court tapes and records, interviews 
with and testing of the parents, testing from the children, professional research, and 
observat ons from Carol Coulter, CSW, who completed a comprehensive evaluation of the 
family2. Dr. BealPs assessments signal the necessity for undertaking these evaluations on the 
Grays and calling an expert witness in their behalf to testify at trial, which Hart 11 and Farris 
erroneously failed to do. 
Cn January 10,2005, Mark and Christina were individually sentenced to one to fifteen 
years in lie Utah State Prison and fined $18,500.00, which sentence and fine was suspended. 
They eaoh received three (3) years of probation and 180 days of jail time in the Salt Lake 
County J ail. On January 10,2005, and February 4,2005, the trial court entered its Judgment. 
Cta February 7, 2005, the Grays filed their joint Notice of Appeal with respect to the 
judgmert. On February 28, 2005, Mark and Christina filed their Docketing Statement, 
challenging the effectiveness of their individual trial counsel at the jury trial. 
On March 18,2005, the Grays filed theirJointMotionfor Certificate of Probable Cause 
and Memorandum in Support with respect to the issue of whether Hartill and Farris were 
ineffective in failing to request a lesser-included misdemeanor offense jury instruction at the 
conclus on of the case. In his oral findings at the conclusion of the hearing on April 18,2005, 
Dr. BealFs assessments indicate that he did not personally interview J.G. 
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Judge Reese found that it was likely that, had the Grays requested a lesser included offense jury 
instruction at the conclusion of the trial, they would have been entitled to it according to the 
facts of this matter. Judge Reese additionally found that it may have been that the Grays' trial 
counsels made a mistake in not requesting the lesser included offense jury instrudion. Judge 
Reese, however, ultimately denied certificate of probable cause. 
On April 29,2005, Mark and Christina filed their detailed Joint Rule 23B Motion for 
Remand alleging that Mark and Christina's prior attorneys failed to adequately investigate the 
case, failed to present necessary evidence, and failed to prepare Mark and Christina to testify, 
resulting in a violation of their constitutional right to testify. Mark and Christina provided 
documentation from the Division of Child and Family Services and the Salt Lske County 
Sheriff s Department which was supportive of their case, but were unable to obtain affidavits 
pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 23B due to the oppositional nature of the witnesses who prepared 
the documentation. Thus, this Court denied the Rule 23B Motion, indicating that the 
documentation was considered hearsay. Mark and Christina filed a motion for this Court to 
reconsider the denial of the Rule 23B remand; however, it was denied before the < 3rays were 
allowed to reply to the State's response. 
On May 19,2005, the Grays filed their Joint Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause 
and Memorandum in Support with the Utah Court of Appeals. In an order signed June 16, 
2005, the Utah Court of Appeals denied the Grays' Joint Motion for Certificate cfProbable 
Cause and Memorandum in Support. 
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Ctiristina reported to the Salt Lake County Jail facility on January 17, 2005, and has 
completed her incarceration and been released. Mark reported to the Salt Lake County Jail 
facility on July 15,2005, and is currently incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The determination as to whether a lesser included offense instruction should be given 
finds its rationale in the due process clause of UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amends. V and 
XIV § 1: CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Art. I § 7. Both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have upheld that due process requires a lesser included offense instruction 
be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. State v. Simmons. 759 P.2d 1152 
(Utah IS 88) c#wgBaker,671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) and Hopper v. Evans. 456 U.S. 605,611, 
102 S.C1.2049,2052-2053,72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated 
that the absence of a lesser included offense instruction increases the risk that the jury will 
convict, not because it is persuaded that the defendant is guilty, but simply to avcid setting the 
defendaitfree. Spazianov.Florida,468U.S.447.455.104S.Ct.3154,82L.Ed.2d340(1984). 
It is lonj; settled that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a lesser-included instruction, and 
the couit has no independent duty to give such an instruction if not requested. See State v. 
Howell 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1992); State v. Mitchell. 278 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1955). 
Although the evidence warranted such an instruction in the instant matter, as recognized by the 
trial court, Hartill and Farris both failed to request a lesser included offense jury mstruction that 
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would have allowed the jury the option of convicting Appellants of a class A misdemeanor 
rather than a felony. 
This Court recently undertook an analysis of the issue of ineffectiveness as. it pertains 
to failure to call and expert witness on the defendant's behalf. Fedorowicz v. Stat s. 2005 UT 
App. 405, — P.2d. —. This Court examined the prejudice prong to an ineffective assistance 
claim as it pertains to this issue by indicating that "[i]t is well established that trial tactics and 
strategies including what witnesses to call [and] what defenses to put forth are within the 
prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment." Fedorowicz 
at 12 citing State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993). "Accordingly, 1o establish 
deficient performance, a petitioner must 'rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. citingState 
v. Litherhmd. 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92. The only element in controversy in Hartill and 
Farris' defense strategy was that of "intentionally and knowingly" causing the harm to J.G. 
Hartill and Farris failed to call an expert witness on the Grays' behalf at trial, e/en though 
doing so would be in line with their defense strategy. The expert retained post-trial assessed 
that there was no malicious intent on the Grays part with respect to the circumstances 
surrounding this case. Failure to retain an expert to present this evidence to the jury severely 
prejudiced the Grays' case. 
Ths Utah Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in May of 2004 in the c ise of State 
v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8,84 P.3d 841, and determined in a decision handed down on June 7, 
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2005, th*t the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction 
carried vdth it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a dejpree of proof 
below the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, f30. With 
such a risk inherent in requiring a degree of proof that "obviates all reasonable doubt," a juror 
may have found the Grays guilty under a standard less than that of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt," violating their due process rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED 
STATES (CONSTITUTION. Although not specifically objected to at trial, this Court has previously 
held tha: the "[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching 
issues not properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of 
law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. TJML 2003 UT App. 191, 
116,73?3d959. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HARTTLL AND FARRIS FAILED TO REQUEST A NECESSARY 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION 
A. Lesser-Included Offense Jury Instructions. 
The determination as to whether a lesser included offense instructipn should be given 
finds its rationale in the due process clause of UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amends. V and 
XIV § ] ; CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Art. I § 7. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have upheld that due process requires a lesser included offense instruction be 
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given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. State v. Simmons. 759 P.2d 1152 (Utah 
1988) c#wgBaker,671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) and Hopper v. Evans. 456 U.S. 605, 611,102 
S.Ct. 2049,2052-2053,72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court has promulgated that 
the absence of a lesser included offense instruction increases the risk that the jury will convict, 
not becaus e it is persuaded that the defendant is guilty, but simply to avoid setting th i defendant 
free. Soaziano v.Florida. 468 U.S. 447,455, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). 
It is long settled that a defendant has a choice whether to seek a lessor-included 
instruction, and the court has no independent duty to give such an instruction if not requested. 
See State v.HowelL 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1992); State v. Mitchell. 278 P.2d 618 621 (Utah 
1955). If a defendant chooses to seek a lesser-included offense instruction, howevtar, the Utah 
Supreme Court has set a basis for determining whether the trial court should instruct the jury 
in that regard, as follows: 
Basis for determining whether to instruct jury regarding lesser included offense 
at defendant's request is whether evidence warrants it; where two offenses are 
related because some of their statutory elements overlap, and where evidenc e at 
trial of greater offense includes proof of some or all of those overlapping 
elements, lesser offense is included offense under statute incorporating evidei ice-
based standard, and court is obligated to instruct on lesser offense if evidence 
offered provides rational basis for verdict acquitting defendant of offense 
charged and convicting him of included offense. 
State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). The Utah Court of Appeals has recently mdertaken 
a more thorough examination of this issue, as follows: 
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Ii considering second prong of two-part evidence-based analysis used for 
determining whether to grant defendant's request for jury instructions on 
claimed lesser-included offense, if evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to 
alternative explanations, trial court must give such an instruction if any one of 
tlie alternative interpretations provides both rational basis for verdict acquitting 
d efendant of offense charged and convicting him of lesser-included offense; this 
standard does not allow court in jury cases to weigh credibility of evidence 
c ffered by defendant in support of his or her request for lesser-included offense 
Listruction. 
Ii determining whether rational jury could acquit on greater charge and find 
guilty on lesser charge, for purposes of determining whether to grant defendant's 
r squest for jury instructions on claimed lesser-included offense, court must view 
evidence and inferences that can be drawn from it in light most favorable to 
defendant 
State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah App. 1998). 
Ihe Utah Court of Appeals has recently concluded that, when an elemem: of the crime 
such as intent is in dispute and the evidence is consistent with both the defendant's and the 
State's theory of the case, failing to instruct on the lesser included offense presump tively affects 
the outcome of the trial. State v. Knight 2003 UT App 354, [^17, 79 P.3d 969. In such 
circumsiances, confidence in the verdict is undermined because the available evidence could 
support a jury's decision to convict on either the greater or lesser crime. Id.; see, State v. 
Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah 1984) ("'[W]here proof of an element of the crime is in 
dispute, the availability of the "third option"-the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather 
than corviction of the greater or acquittal—gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable 
doubt sfcindard.'" (alterations in original) (quotingBakei. 671 P.2d at 167)); State v. Pavne. 964 
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P.2d 327, 334 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict" (citations 
and quotations omitted)). 
B, Elements of Charge and Lesser-Included Offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109 states, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) As used in this section: 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes 
serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of d sath 
to the child, including: 
(vi i) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability 
to limction; 
(x) any conduct Svhich results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition 
that jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the 
care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious phys ical 
injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor 
As given n Jury Instructions Nos. 14 and 15 at the trial in this matter, the elements of the 
offense charged in this matter, Second Degree Felony Child Abuse, are that the defendants (a) 
inflicted serious physical injury upon J.G., or (b) having the care or custody of J.G, caused or 
permitted another to inflict serious physical injury on J.G., (c) that such infliction, causing or 
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permitting the infliction of serious physical injury was done intentionally or knowingly; and (d) 
that the person upon whom the serious physical injury was inflicted, or caused or permitted to 
be inflicted, J.G., was at the time a child. The elements of Class A Misdemeanor Child Abuse 
parallel those of the higher charge in that it requires a showing that the defendant (a) inflicted 
serious physical injury upon a person who was at the time a child, or (b) havirg the care or 
custody of the child, caused or permitted another to inflict serious physical injury on a person 
who(c) was at the time a child. The only element that differs in the lesser offense is that the 
actions were done with "criminal negligence" rather than "intentionally" or "knowingly." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103 sets forth the definitions of these differing elements, as 
follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, oi with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
tie failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
tiat an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
tie actor's standpoint. 
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Under the Baker test as set forth above, it is clear that class A misdemeanor chile abuse is a 
lesser-included offense of second degree felony child abuse in that "...some of their statutory 
elements overlap, and Q evidence at trial of greater offense includes proof of sorie or all of 
those overlapping elements." 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
C. Evidence Could Support the Common Elements Included in Botl i Offenses. 
The State of Utah called an expert witness at trial, Dr. David Lewis Corv/in, who is 
trained as a psychiatrist, child psychiatrist and forensic psychiatrist, who is working as a 
professor of pediatrics at the University of Utah, chief of the Division of Child Protection and 
Family Health and medical director of Primary Children's Center for Safe and Healthy 
Families. (September 16, 2004, Transcripts at p. 191). Neither Hartill nor F arris either 
prepared or called an expert, or any other witness in response to Dr. Corwin's test imony. Dr. 
Corwin testified that chaining a child in the house for an extended period of tine is not a 
reasonable; method to protect a child and that is clearly in the realm of ps) etiological 
maltreatment/abuse. (September 16, 2004, Transcripts at p. 225). This uncontroverted 
testimony could support the element of whether serious physical injury was inflicted which, as 
set forth xupra, is an element of the charge and the lesser-included offense. It was well 
established that J.G. was a minor in that there was testimony offered in that regard and J.G. 
himself testified at the trial, so the only element in controversy was whether Christin a and Mark 
undertook the actions "intentionally" and "knowingly" to rise to a level of a second degree 
felony. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109(2)(a). 
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D. Evidence Supporting Lesser-Included Offense. 
The second prong of the Baker test requires a showing that the evidence offered 
provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of offense charged and convicting 
him of included offense. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). In Pavne. the Utah Court of Appeals 
expanded this second prong to require trial courts to give such an instruction if the evidence 
is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations. 964 P.2d 327,328 (Utah App. 1998). 
ff,[W]hers proof of an element of the crime is in dispute, the availability of the "third 
option"-the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater or 
acquittal-gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.1" Statev.Oldroyd. 
685 P.2d 551,556 (Utah 1984) (alterations in the original) quoting Baker at 167. 
Criminal negligence is defined under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103(4) as follows: 
A person engages in conduct [w]ith criminal negligence or is criminally 
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
die circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
aad degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
s andard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Hartill and Farris both presented or solicited evidence from witnesses indicating that neither 
Mark ncr Christina Gray "knowingly" or "intentionally" inflicted serious physical injury upon 
J.G. Ths defense's argument instead surrounded the contention that the Grays felt they were 
trying to protect J.G. from harming himself by running away. The defense argued that the 
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Grays never tried to conceal the fact that they were chaining J.G. from anyone, including 
church acquaintances, friends, neighbors, and even police officers. Farris also argued that the 
Grays relied upon what they perceived to be permission from Deputy Timpson tc undertake 
such an action, and an instruction was specifically given to the jury on this is me3. This 
evidence, .is set forth more precisely below, is directly in sync with the definition 3f criminal 
negligence;. 
The Grays were very candid with friends, family, police officers, and this Court about 
the fact that J.G. was being chained downstairs to keep him from running away. On i particular 
day unestablished attrial, Ms. Johnson-who is achurch acquaintance of the Grays-testified that 
she was visiting the Grays and Christina told her that J.G. had just returned home from having 
run away and that she had chained him. (September 15, 2004, Transcripts, at p. 38). Ms. 
Johnson then went downstairs unimpeded by Christina and saw J.G. sitting on a bed with a 
chain around his waist. Id. 
Deputy Mike Lee testified that, upon arriving at the house and requesting to see J.G., 
the children did not attempt to hide anything from the deputy, but brought J.G. to Deputy Lee 
and provided information to him respecting the fact that J.G. was chained to keep him from 
running away. Id. at pp. 86,91-92. Deputy Lee also testified that when Mark returned home 
shortly thereafter, he was candid with him about the fact that they had to chain J.G. 1 o keep him 
from running away. Id. at p. 87. Someone in the Gray household informed Depi ty Lee that 
3
 Jury Instruction No. 20. CGR105, MGR096. 
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Deputy Timpson, who had previously been out to the residence, had told the Grays that they 
should chain J.G. with handcuffs. Id. at p. 94. 
Tie Grays cooperated in the investigation of this matter and voluntarily submitted 
themselves to videotaped interviews at the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. (September 15, 
2004, Transcripts at pp. 119,158). Deputy Marian Suarez interviewed Mark Gray and, even 
after hearing the Miranda warnings, Mark admitted to chaining J.G. Id. at p. 118. Mark Gray 
informed Deputy Suarez that he was advised from Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department that 
in restraining J.G. he was told that he could do anything as long as J.G. was not hurt. Id. at p. 
121. Deputy Suarez was also in charge of the search warrant conducted at the Gray's home and 
testified that the Grays were cooperative during the search. Id. at p. 122. 
Eeputy Danielle Mudrock interviewed Christina Gray. After providing the Miranda 
warning*, Christina admitted to chaining J.G. (September 15, 2004, Transcripts at p. 159). 
Deputy Mudrock testified that Christina did not act as though the chaining was a "big deal" or 
something to be ashamed of. Id. 
J.G.'s principal, Ernst D. Broderick, testified at the trial on this matter ;md provided 
much insight into the Grays and J.G.'s behavioral difficulties. Mr. Broderick testified that the 
Grays were very active and supportive respecting J.G.'s schooling, indicating that he interacted 
with them more than any other parent in the school. (September 16, 2004, Transcripts at p. 
367). Mx. Broderick testified that Christina told him and Deputy Timpson that she was almost 
26 
to the point of handcuffing J.G. to her to keep him jfrom running away, to which boih Timpson 
and Broderick agreed might be reasonable considering the circumstances. Id at p. 365. 
Colleena Norman, who was living with the Grays during the time J.G. wsis removed 
from their care testified that J.G. would run away frequently and that the Grays were very 
concerned over this. (September 16,2004, Transcripts at pp. 416-417). Colleena tc stifled that 
the family would go out looking for him every time he ran away as soon as they real] zed he was 
gone. Id at p. 417. Colleena testified that the Grays never tried to conceal the fact that J.G. 
was being chained and never told any of the children that they should not talk about it with 
neighbors, visitors, police officers, or church people. Id at p. 428. 
J.G. was removed by the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") following 
the incident at issue herein. DCFS provided Family Preservation Services to the remaining 
children in the home through caseworker Feleti Matagi. (September 16,2004, Tninscripts at 
p. 391). Although Utah law provides for the removal of siblings who are at risk for neglect or 
abuse, see UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-103(l)(s)(i)(E), none of the other five sittings were 
removed. After visiting the Grays' home unannounced on several occasions, lAx. Matagi 
recommem ded that the remaining children remain in the home since the children stat ed they felt 
safe and they were adjusting well. Id. at p. 394. 
Jason Kass was another friend of the Grays who had spent a significant amount of his 
time with ihe Gray family, approximately 90% of his time over the last five years. (September 
16,2004, Transcripts at p. 430). Mr. Kass testified that he had seen J.G. chained only after 
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Deputy Timpson had okayed it. Id. at pp. 431-432. Mr. Kass testified that J.G. was only 
chained very few times. Id. Mr. Kass was not present when Timpson had the conversation 
with Christina, but indicated that Mark and Christina had informed him they had permission 
from him to chain J.G. Id. at pp. 434-435. 
Jean Woolston, a neighbor and friend of the Grays, testified at trial that her children 
played with Mark and Christina's children frequently. (September 16,2004, Trajiscripts at pp. 
447-44$ ). Ms. Woolston knew the Grays were chaining J.G. because Mark and Christina told 
her they were. Id. at pp. 454,456. The Grays never attempted to conceal this fact from Ms. 
Woolstcn. Id. at pp. 457-458. 
Defenses' arguments and the evidence presented at trial clearly support the lesser 
included offense of class A misdemeanor child abuse. Evidence was presented at trial that 
could support the idea that Mark and Christina thought they were protecting J.G. from running 
away and that they believed a deputy had instructed them that this was reasonable. Evidence 
was presented at trial that could support the idea that Mark and Christina ought to have been 
aware o f the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exists or the result would 
occur, aid that the risk was of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constituted 
a deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exerc:se in all the 
circums lances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103(4). 
A lesser included offense juiy instruction would have given the Grays the benefit of the 
reasonable doubt standard. See, State v. Oldrovd, 685 P.2d 551,556 (Utah 198^) (alterations 
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in the orignal) quoting Baker at 167. Absent an instruction on the lesser included offense, the 
risk is heightened that the jury convicted Mark and Christina, not because it was persuaded that 
they were guilty, but simply to avoid acquitting them. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 
447,455, ] 04 S.Ct. 3154,82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). The third option of a lesser included offense 
was necessary to the defense presented by Hartill and Farris on the Grays behalf. If the lesser 
included offense had been requested, this Court would have been required to give it. State v. 
Pavne. 964 P.2d 327,328 (Utah App. 1998). 
E. Hartill and Farris Were Ineffective in Failing to Request the Necessary 
Lesser Included Instruction. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, " fa defendant must show (1) 
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different/ " Wickham v. Galetka. 
2002 UT 72,119, 61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see 
also StricUand v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,686-87,104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
In making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption th*.t counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is the defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy. Mvers v. State. 2004 UT 31, f20,94 P.3d 211, citing State v. 
Templin. 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct 2052) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Knowledge of the law is a basic prerequisite to providing competent legil assistance. 
State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236,246 (Utah App.,1997). If an attorney does not investigate clearly 
relevant law, then he or she has objectively failed to provide effective assistance. Id. As 
argued supra, a lesser included offense jury instruction on class A misdemeanor child abuse 
was not only warranted, but necessary to the Grays' defense as their attorneys had presented 
it 
Hartill and Farris' defense all but conceded at trial the element regarding whether 
"severe physical injury" had occurred, leaving only their strategy to controvert the allegations 
that Mark and Christina"knowingly or intentionally" caused the harm to J.G. The fact that J.G. 
had beei chained and the testimony by Dr. Corwin that this behavior was in the realm of 
psychological maltreatment/abuse was uncontoverted. Hartill and Farris' failure to rebut, by 
expert testimony or otherwise, Dr. Corwin's testimony that chaining is not a reasonable means 
to protect a child and is in the realm of psychological maltreatment/abuse caused that element 
to be un controverted. Reasonable criminal attorneys, at a minimum, would ha\ e recognized 
that with Dr. Corwin's uncontroverted testimony it was unlikely that a jury would acquit Mark 
and Christina. 
A reasonable criminal attorney would have also recognized the fact that none of the 
evidence presented by the State was conclusive as to the intent and knowledge of the Grays. 
Since it was thus susceptible to alternative explanations, it is conceivable that the jury could 
have believed that Mark and Christina were simply trying to protect J.G. md that they 
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negligently failed to perceive the risks associated with their actions. Without individually 
weighing the evidence, but drawing inferences in a light most favorable to the defendants, it 
is clear that the lesser included jury instruction should have been requested and j*iven. See, 
Payne at 328. 
Ths lesser included offense was necessary to the defense Hartill and Farris presented 
to this Court. Farris relied upon the defense that Deputy Timpson had given the Grays 
permission to chain J.G.4 Jury Instruction No. 23 pertains to this defense, as is f Hind under 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-304(2)5. However, a thorough reading of §76-2-304 shows that 
subsection (3), which was absent from Jury Instruction No. 23, indicates that "[although an 
actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he 
may neveitheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he would be jjuilty if the 
fact or law were as he believed." By its plain language, this defense is not a compbte defense 
and necessitated a request for a lesser included offense jury instruction. 
Hartill focused his defense on the idea that Christina was protecting J.G. by chaining 
him and that it was thus not child abuse. However, with no witness to rebut Di. Corwin's 
4
 Farris also contended in his closing argument that the State had failed to meet their 
burden since there was no physical evidence of injury. Farris failed to recognize that the State's 
position pertained to the emotional aspect of the definition of "serious physical injury." See 
footnote"!" above. 
5
 L TAH CODE ANN. §76-2-304(2)(b)(ii) requires that the interpretation of the law 
mistakenly relied upon by an individual be written; however, Farris did not present any written 
interpretation by Deputy Timpson, nor did he argue that Deputy Timpson was a "public servant 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question." See footnote T' above. 
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testimory that chaining was not a reasonable means to protect a child and is in the realm of 
psychological maltreatment/abuse, Hartill should have realized that the jury cou d have likely 
found that the severe physical injury occurred in the form of emotional harm. In other words, 
it is conceivable by the evidence presented at trial that the jury could have believed Dr. 
Corwin's testimony and found that the element was met, but could have *dso believed 
Christina's contention that she did not intentionally or knowingly cause the harm. However, 
without the lesser included offense jury instruction, the jury was not given this opportunity. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[t]o expect a jury ... to find a defendant 
innocen and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty 
of some crime requires of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience." 
Beck v. Alabama. 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). In State v. 
Simpson., the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense 
instruction... precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's 
practice will diverge from theory." 904 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah App. 1995). If, in the instant 
matter, the jury found that the element of serious physical injury had been mei through Dr. 
Corwin' s incontroverted testimony, it could not be expected to then acquit Mark and Christina. 
Hence, tie failure to request the lesser included offense undermines the jury's verdict and there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
IE. HARTILL AND FARRIS WERE 
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO CALL 
A NECESSARY EXPERT WITNESS 
ON THE GRAYS' BEHALF 
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This Court recently undertook an analysis of this issue in Fedorowicz v. Stai e. 2005 UT 
App. 405, — P.2d. —. This Court examined the prejudice prong to an ineffective assistance 
claim as it pertains to failure to call and expert witness, by indicating that "[i]t is well 
establishe i that trial tactics and strategies including what witnesses to call [and] wt at defenses 
to put forth are within the prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's p rofessional 
judgment" Fedorowicz at f2 citing State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993). 
"Accordirgly, to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must 'rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy.'" Id citinz State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,1fl9, 12 P.3d 92. 
In lie instant matter, as discussed supra, the State properly notified Hartil] and Farris 
of its intent to call Dr. Corwin as an expert witness in the matter. Hartill and Fan is' defense 
all but conceded at trial the element regarding whether "severe physical injury" had occurred, 
leaving only their strategy to controvert the allegations that Mark and Christina"kcowingly or 
intentionally" caused the harm to J.G. Hartill and Farris' defense conceded that J.G. had been 
chained. The testimony by Dr. Corwin that this behavior was in the realm of psychological 
maltreatmsnt/abuse could conceivably be considered uncontoverted evidence conclusively 
proving a necessary element of the charge-that of whether "serious physical injury " occurred. 
Reasonable criminal attorneys, at a minimum, would have recognized that with Dr. Corwin's 
uncontroverted testimony on an element of the charge it was unlikely that a jury wDuld acquit 
Mark and Christina. 
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Counsel herein retained Dr. Lawrence D. Beall, Ph.D., the director of the Trauma 
Awareness & Treatment Center, to undertake a study of the Grays for purposes of sentencing 
in this natter since Hartill and Farris had failed to call an expert on their behalf at trial. 
CGR120; MGR112. Dr. Beall conducted Psychological Assessments on both Mark and 
Christin i Gray and a Parenting Assessment, and undertook clinical observations and research 
regarding the issues germane to this case. Id. Dr. Beall's assessments and reports were 
provided to the trial court prior to sentencing and are part of the record on appeal. Id. In the 
process of conducting the Parenting Assessment, Dr. Beall relied upon information gleaned 
from court tapes and records, interviews with and testing of the parents, testing from the 
children, professional research, and observations from Carol Coulter, CSW, whe completed a 
comprehensive evaluation of the family. Id. 
I>r. Beall's assessments signal the necessity for undertaking these evaluations on the 
Grays and calling an expert witness in their behalf to testify at trial, which Hartill and Farris 
erroneously failed to do. CGR120; MGR112. In his parenting assessment, Dr. Beall 
specifiatlly opined that he believed J.G. had been the product of coercive child-rearing 
techniques which had developed into an oppositional defiant behavior pattern and more severe 
antisocial and aggressive behaviors, established before Christina ever became his stepmother. 
Id9 "Paienting of Mark & Christina Gray" (the "Parenting Assessment") at p. 1. With this 
pattern in place, it is Dr. Beall's opinion that Mark and Christina's lack of parenting skills may 
have exs cerbated J.G.' s problems by attempting various interventions with more frequency and 
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intensity the more resistence J.G. exhibited. Id. With a child in this pattern already, as the 
frequency and intensity of discipline increased, there was a corresponding increase in J.G.'s 
resistence. Id. Dr. Beall believes this interactive and self-defeating cycle is what occurred 
between the Grays and J.G. Id. 
Dr. Beall believes that J.G.'s experiences with Bonnie prior to coming to li\ e with the 
Grays cannot be separated from the escalating problems he experienced with Mark and 
Christina. Hartill and Farris both attempted to argue this position of J.G.'s prioi abuse by 
Bonnie in iheir closing arguments, but failed to actually present any of the infoimation as 
evidence tc the jury on the matter. Farris argued in his closing that J.G. admitted tf at Bonnie 
had done bad things to him, but Farris said he did not want to "...get into specifics.. " because 
"...I think we've heard about those and I, myself don't want to hear about them any n ore." (Tr. 
at p. 488). In fact, Farris was mistaken in that J.G. was unable to testify to the abuse by 
Bonnie, as recognized by Dr. Beall in his assessment. Hartill similarly argued in his closing 
that "...we heard [J.G.'s] biological mother beat him, locked him up, denied him food and hit 
him in the head." (Tr. at p. 495). The jury never heard this evidence. It is Dr. Beall's opinion 
that the anger and resentment that would be expected from the abuses by Bonnie bee ame a part 
of J.G.'s relationship with Christina. Hartill and Farris' defense strategy regarding this matter 
necessitated an expert witness to support their contention. 
Dr. BealFs overall assessment of Mark and Christina does not attempt to comrovert Dr. 
Corwin's determination that chaining is in the realm of psychological abuse/maltreatment, but 
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instead ex plains how the chaining could have occurred by the Grays, whom Dr. Be all assessed 
to have "ao evidence of malicious intent." Parenting Assessment at p. 11. Dr. Beall's 
determinations obviously regard the element of either "knowingly or intentionally" or with 
"criminal negligence" as discussed supra. It is clear that this evidence regarding the intent of 
the Grays could have affected the outcome of this trial had Hartill and Farris called an expert 
on the Grey's behalf. This was the only element apparently in controversy in Hartill and Farris' 
defense strategies and, as shown by Dr. Beall's assessment, necessarily required expert 
testimony. 
Hartill and Farris' determination not to call an expert witness on Mark and Christina's 
behalf could not have conceivably fallen under the realm of "sound trial strategy." Hartill and 
Farris intended to concede at trial that the chaining did occur and did not intend to rebut Dr. 
Corwin's testimony that this behavior was in the realm of psychological abuse/maltreatment 
The elem ait Farris and Hartill intended to focus their strategy on was that Mark and Christina 
did not have the requisite knowledge or intent to rise to a second degree felony. i\n adequate 
and reasonable defense on such an element would necessitate some form of psychological 
assessment on Mark and Christina, particularly given their counsel's own belief that they were 
not the type of people to have intentionally or knowingly harmed J.G. 
Gdling an expert on their behalf would have been in line with Hartill and Farris' defense 
strategy. Given their strategy, there was no "sound trial strategy" that would have dictated that 
they should have avoided calling an expert in this area. Their failure to call an expert, such as 
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Dr. Beall, caused the jury to only hear evidence regarding the prosecution's theory of the case 
that Mark ;uid Christina were guilty to a second degree felony level. As Dr. Beall's issessment 
shows, the outcome of the trial may have been different had Mark and Christina had the benefit 
of an expert witness who could tell the jury that they showed no evidence of intent vdth respect 
to the charge. 
Hartill and Farris were ineffective for failing to recognize the need to call and expert 
witness on Mark and Christina's behalf with respect to the element of "intentionally and 
knowingly" causing harm to J.G. It severely prejudiced the Grays' case a: trial and 
consequently affected their constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel. 
in. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
INCORRECTLY STATES THE LAW 
No person accused in the United States of America may be convicted of a crime unless 
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States 
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both the 
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jtry trial. Jn 
reWinship 397 U.S. 358, 362, 364, 90 S. Ct 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added); 
Sullivan v Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397 U.S. at 364,90 S. 
Ct. at 1073,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its holding in State v. Robertson. 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a reasonable 
doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, f 1. The first part of 
Robertsc in required the instruction to indicate that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
The original concept of this prong appeared"...to derive from a fear that in ascertaining the 
conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror might misapply tlie 'beyond a 
reasonat le doubt' standard unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable 
doubt with evidence." Reves. 2005 UT 33, J 25. 
The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and determined to abandon it 
based on the fact that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the 
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reves. 2005 UT 33. % 30. The Utah Supreme Court xmdertook the following 
analysis respecting this matter: 
f^ !5 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial court 
eired when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at ^19. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland. 
T'3 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There, Justice 
Si ewart took issue with an instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that 
siace the standard to be applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that 
any definition of the standard must reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt-to 
be overcome by the evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must 
surmount the obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a feat that in 
ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror 
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might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required 
to ssarch out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence. 
[^26 Insightfiil and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a reasons ble 
doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect. Not 
every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best wl ere 
proDf is scant or lacking in credibility. In these instances, a descriptior of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their 
conviction concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and 
useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct Jhiat 
reqiires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes 
them. A universal application of the notion that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the 
presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate 
reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it follows 
thai the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every case. We do lot, 
however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of innocence. 
f 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is ,-dso 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of pi oof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The 
"ob viation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification of 
the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. TTiis 
process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the snd 
of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however, condition a conclusion 
thai a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state 
a re ason for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
*8128 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the State to 
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works 
to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the Notre Dame Law 
Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding prominence of the 
requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of 
Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the 
Presumption of Innocence. 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor 
Sheppard summarized the central vice of this trend this way: A troub ing 
cor elusion that arises from the difficulties of the requirement of articulabiliiy is 
that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of 
the evidence is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an 
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obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that appears focused on the details 
o f the arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which the rhetc ric of 
tie law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state burden of proof, 
require acquittal. Id at 1213. 
%19 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and fairly communicated 
ttrough an affirmative description of the degree of conviction that must be 
altained by a juror based on the evidence. We see little to be gained by including 
within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the potentially confusing 
concept that every defendant is entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt, 
which the State's evidence must obviate. 
%\Q Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element of 
Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt 
based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we expressly 
abandon it. 
Rgyes at f124-30. 
Lo the instant matter, Jury Instruction No. 8 expressly indicates that "[p]roof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that. . .obviates all reasonable doubt," which is 
substantively the same as the prong in Robertson requiring the jury instruction to state that the 
State's evidence must "obviate all reasonable doubt." CGR093; MGR084; Tr. at pp. 470-471. 
As indica ted by the Utah Supreme Court, this instruction carries with it the substantial risk that 
a juror found the Grays guilty based on a degree of proof below "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
With suci a risk inherent in the use of the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt," a juror may 
have violated the Grays' due process rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was not preserved by 
trial counsel at the trial in this matter, this Court should review the matter based upon 
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exceptional circumstances. This Court has previously held that the "[exceptional 
circumstan ces concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not properly pr< served for 
appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colors the failire to have 
raised an is sue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M. 2003 UT App 191,1(16,73 P.3d. 959. Ttie original 
decision was handed down by this Court in State v. Reves on January 15,2004, upholding the 
three-part test in Robertson, and the prong requiring the use of the language "obviate all 
reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 84. Review was granted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in that matter in May of 2004. The trial in the instant matter was held September 15,16, 
and 17,2035, while review of Reyes was pending. The Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Reves, abandoning the three-part test in Robertson was handed down on June 7, 
2005. It is clear that this change in law, overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson 
was clearly an unsettled interpretation of the law that colored the ability of the Crrays' trial 
counsel to raise the issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the Judgment and remand this matter for retrial. 
DATED this day of , 2005. 
Barton J. Warren 
Attorney for Christina L. Gray and 
Mark J. Gray 
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Addendum ~A~ 
Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, 
dated January 10, 2005 and February 4, 2005 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTINA LEE GRAY, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901871 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: January 10, 2005 
PRESENF 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WARREN JR, BARTON J 
DEFEND.MJT INFORMATION 
Date oE birth: September 3, 1968 
Video 
Tape Namber: TAPE Tape Coun t : 1 0 : 3 0 
CHARGE3 
1. CHIliD ABUSE/NEGLECT 
PLea: Not Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 09/17/2004 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 041901871 
Date: Jan 10, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $18500.00 
Suspended: $18500.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $18500.00 
Total Suspended: $18500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
TotaL Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by January 17, 2005. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Page 2 
Case Nc: 041901871 
Date: Jan 10, 2005 
Parole. 
SERVE 180 DAYS JAIL - REPORT 1/17/05 
COMPLETE PARENTING, ANGER MANAGEMENT, MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 
NO CONTACT WITH JEFFERY UNLESS APPROVED 
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS 
Dated this //) day of c^jX^] , 20(^5" 
Page 3 (last) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OE UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK JA1VES GRAY, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041901870 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REES2 
Date: January 10, 2)05 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: PARKER, PAUL B 
Defendart 
Defendart's Attorney(s): WARREN JR, BARTON J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 30, 1964 
Video 
Tape Nuxrber: TAPE Tape Count: 10:30 
CHARGES 
1- CHILE ABUSE/NEGLECT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 09/17/2004 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in 1-he Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 041901870 
Date: Jan 10, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based or the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
SENTENCE PINE 
Charge # 1 Pine: $18500.00 
Suspended: $18500.00 
Total Fine: $18500.00 
Tctal Suspended: $18500.00 
Tc tal Surcharge: $ 0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OP PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s) * 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendart to serve 18 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendart is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendart is to report by July 15, 2005. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual ard ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon, the reques: of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not ise, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, lor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of aiy Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseliig, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation, and 
Parole. 
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Case No: 041901870 
Date: Jan 10, 2005 
SERVE 180 DAYS JAIL (REPORT 7/15/05) 
COMPLETE PARENTING, ANGER MANAGEMENT, AND. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 
NO CONTACT WITH JEFFERY UNLESS APPROVED 
FOLLOW ALL PROBATION PROGRAMS 
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Addendum ~B~ 
Jury Instruction No. 8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and defendants are presumed innocent until 
they are proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in case 
of a reasonable doubt as to, whether his or her guilt is 
satisf act Drily shown, he or she entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upcn the 
State to prove the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable ioufc>t. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable m view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
that is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof that satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doub: is a 
doubt that reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and defendants are presumed innocent until 
they are proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in case 
of a reasonable doubt as to whether his or her guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he or she entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable douijt. 
Proof b€>yond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in /iew of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
that is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof that satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it, and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable do^bt is a 
doubt that reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must 
anise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
r 
